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Abstract—Cryptography is commonly used to provide link-
layer message authentication in wireless sensor networks. How-
ever, keys are susceptible to compromise and introduce manage-
ment requirements. Avoiding keys can therefore deliver security
and management benefits. Our paper introduces and discusses
the feasibility of RTTMAP, a protocol that uses radio frequency
ranging for message authentication. RTTMAP uses secure round-
trip-time with hash functions to determine the minimum distance
of a transmitter. Transmissions from outside of a defined radius
are rejected without requiring keys. We provide our motivation,
an evaluation of our findings and continuing research challenges.
We find RTTMAP offers higher security, costs about twice the
energy of keyed message authentication but complicates MAC
protocol selection.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) provide a sensing plat-
form for a variety of sensing applications and consist of a
number of nodes, each with wireless communication and an
independant power source (usually batteries). The lack of a
wired infrastructure and inherent redundancy offer a number of
benefits for sensing applications. These benefits include easier
management, lower deployment costs, better scalability and
improved resilience to failure. However, sensor node design is
deliberately minimalist to support long battery life and reduced
financial cost.
WSN applications are now emerging in scenarios where
there is considerable risk to life, the environment or finance
if malicious messages are introduced or network operation
is disrupted. Due to the aforementioned design limitations,
protocols providing WSN security must not only provide
for confidentiality and authentication, but also availability,
survivability and graceful degradation.
Current approaches to avoid malicious use of the network
are mainly based on cryptographic protection. These seek to
protect the privacy and integrity of messages. Modern commu-
nication protocols such as IEEE 802.15.4 provide provide this
at the link-layer, thus providing access control. We identify
three problems with cryptographic approaches.
Firstly, since a WSN is a multi-hop network, link-layer
cryptographic protocols provide good protection only if all the
keys remain secure. Once a single key has been compromised,
it can be used to inject messages into the network. Network
security thus degrades badly when keys are obtained by an
attacker. Avoiding this requires hardening of nodes and regular
key replacement, both of which can be challenging. Thus, we
are motivated to supplement or replace these protocols with
protocols that do not use keys at all.
Secondly, denial-of-service attacks against security proto-
cols themselves are more serious in a WSN due to the
minimalist nature of the nodes. Such attacks vary, but an
attacker will aim to deplete resources with as litlle effort as
possible. One attack is the consumption of resources carrying
out message authentication; even if a message is found to be
malicious, the cryptographic algorithm still has to be executed.
If a public key algorithm is used, this can be very serious. In
others, an attacker might aim to flood a node’s communication
buffer. We are therefore interested in protocols which can
handle denial-of-service.
Finally, key management in a sensor network is not a
straightforward task since it requires the secure generation and
distribution of keys for every pair of adjacent nodes. Avoiding
this overhead and the associated security risks is beneficial.
Cryptography is not the only approach to message authen-
tication available in a WSN. This paper explores the benefits
and challenges of using Radio Frequency (RF) ranging to
authenticate messages in WSNs. RF ranging can offer accurate
distance information that can be very hard for an attacker to
forge. It is thus an ideal security parameter for authentication
purposes in some scenarios.
We introduce RTTMAP, a method of using RF ranging
to authenticate a transmitter based on distance. RTTMAP
integrates secure round-trip-time measurement into message
transfers at the link-layer and enforces a maximum permitted
distance radius. New communication standards and hardware
are now emerging which support the required ranging func-
tions. We believe that RTTMAP is a potential authentication
solution in scenarios where access to a specific physical areas
is restricted and since it does not use keys, it is not vulnerable
to their loss. We evaluate the security benefits, overheads and
upcoming research challenges of RTTMAP via analysis and
simulation of our planned node design.
Our paper is organised as follows. Section II introduces
our scenario and related motivation. Section IIIexplores related
work in the field of WSN security and RF localisation. Sec-
tion IV introduces RTTMAP and related principles. Section V
introduces our planned node design, protocol and simulated
implementation. Section VI evaluates the performance of the
scheme, its cost under attack and implications for MAC
protocol selection. Finally, in Section VII we conclude with
future work.
2II. SCENARIO
We are implementing a building intrusion application based
on a WSN comprising of a number of modified low-power
Tmote Sky[13] sensor nodes. Each sensor node is equipped
with security sensors and sends observation reports to a
controller station. Messages travel across multiple nodes in
the network. Although most messages are intended for the
controller, parts of the system may still require in-network
communication thus requiring link-layer security.
Since the network needs to be left running for a long period
of time, and some nodes are hidden and are hard to reach,
there is also a motivation to extend battery life for as long
as possible. However, if link-layer security is compromised,
problems such as denial-of-service may arise that drain these
resources.
To avoid introduction of transmitters and other electronics,
all persons using the building are checked for devices on
entry and exit; but there remains the risk of cryptographic
key material being stolen by untrustworthy visitors.
Although the WSN is not the only security system in use,
it is important for the WSN to continue to operate even when
under active attack. The building is sufficiently large to permit
rerouting of messages should a particular area come under
attack. By using end-to-end cryptographic authentication[1],
even if some keys are stolen, it can continue to operate in a
degraded state to deliver information to security personnel.
We were motivated to investigate an authentication mecha-
nism that can detect external intrusion without keys. Ranging
is an ideal option, if sufficiently accurate, as each node can
be set with a simple parameter (the maximum distance, set to
the nearest security boundary) and reject messages sent from
outside that distance.
III. RELATED WORK
Security in sensor networks is a very active research area
mainly focusing on cryptographic protocols. Sensor network
applications often omit or use weak security; we believe this is
partly motivated by difficulties in integrating security protocols
and managing relevant keys. RTTMAP helps to avoid this
problem by (1) existing entirely below the link-layer and (2)
not requiring keys and therefore key management.
Link-layer cryptography is motivated by the need for many
sensor network applications to implement in-network process-
ing such as aggregation and filtering. (End-to-end cryptog-
raphy is simply incompatible with these applications since
neighbouring nodes are unable to view or modify data that
passes through them.) Examples include SNEP[5], TinySec[6]
and transceiver-based security found in IEEE 802.15.4. The
greatest weakness of link-layer cryptography is key com-
promise (theft or cryptanalysis). The security of the overall
network degrades badly once this occurs, which motivates the
sole use of end-to-end cryptography in some deployments[1].
A replacement, or additional layer of protection, is therefore
desirable.
Broadcast authentication is used to avoid injection of mali-
cious queries and code updates. Examples include µTESLA[5]
and Secured Deluge[7]. We note that all of these protocols
exhibit some form of denial-of-service vulnerability, such as
energy depletion attack in public-key based methods or buffer
attacks in time-delayed schemes such as µTESLA. These
schemes would benefit from an additional layer of security
as a defence. Although RTTMAP does not currently support
broadcast, in some scenarios adapted broadcast protocols could
be used with RTTMAP.
Security at the physical layer has been shown to provide
enhanced security. [2] integrates keys with error correction
codes. By applying security at this layer, it is harder for
an attacker to deduce the headers in a message, let alone
successfully deliver one to another node. If a message cannot
be delivered, it is harder (or infeasible) for an attacker to attack
cryptography in the higher layers. RTTMAP takes a similar
approach.
Secure ranging is an established WSN research area for
positioning applications[8]. A number of proposals exist which
use signal strength (RSSI), ultrasound[9] or RF timing[10] to
securely measure node seperation. RSSI is widely regarded as
unreliable[11] and requires special attention[3] to avoid poten-
tial power spoofing attacks. Ultra-sound uses a different, and
expensive, communications medium which prevents coupling
with message transmission.
Chirp-Spread-Spectrum (CSS) and Ultra-wideband (UWB)
have recently been introduced in the newer IEEE 802.15.4a
standard for use in wireless sensor networks. These technolo-
gies offer a number of benefits that improve radio ranging.
New transceivers have recently emerged[4] that provide built
in ranging as part of message transmission. Although these do
not properly fit our scheme, they do prove that high accuracy
RF ranging is now feasible in low power devices.
IV. SCHEME
A. Background
Obtaining range measurements using the radio tran-
ceiver eliminates the requirement for additional security
hardware[12] and allows transmissions to be coupled with
ranging. Ranging methods based on signal strength (RSSI)
should not be considered for security purposes because an
attacker might modify power output to manipulate measure-
ments.
Another method, time-of-flight (ToF), times the delay be-
tween message transmission and message reception to obtain
the range. ToF requires that the clocks of both nodes are
synchronised, which is difficult to achieve securely and with
sufficient accuracy. ToF also requires that the sender include
a timestamp in each message, which therefore requires trust.
ToF can therefore be manipulated.
The same principle as ToF can be extended to measure the
Round-Trip-Time (RTT). In RTT a message is sent to, and
returned by, the other node. A timer is started when a message
is transmitted and then stopped when it has been received. RTT
thus does not require timestamps or clock synchronisation and
is more secure. We therefore consider RTT.
RTT and ToF have an interesting property in that they
operate using a fixed propogation speed, the speed of light,
that cannot be accelerated by an adversary using current
3technology. Therefore, in RTT, if we eliminate the potential
for the other node to respond early, we can enforce a truth
boundary. If the other node cannot reply early, it cannot appear
to be closer, although it can reply late and thus appear further
away. We are not concerned with distance exaggeration, but
we do exploit the former.
This principle has been applied before[10] and requires that
the request message contains a value (or ’nonce’) that cannot
be predicted by the node that returns the message. Therefore
the other node cannot feasibly reply early.
B. Round-Trip-Time Message Authentication Protocol
Secure RTT must be initiated from the secure side of the
link; therefore if it is to be applied to authenticate a transmitter
it will require an additional two messages per transfer1 event.
It is also important that the ranging takes place with the
same node that sent the trigger message. We now outline our
protocol, RTTMAP, and then explain its security properties.
Each node must be configured with a maximum commu-
nication range r. r is the shortest distance to the security
boundary where attackers can transmit into the network.
Note that r must be calculated to take into account timing
inaccuracies, modulation duration, and the turnaround time
on Node A (at the start of Phase 3). When configured, an
attacker will not be able to respond quickly enough to reduce
the ranging measurements to below r.
There are then three phases for each message transfer,
shown in Figure 1:
1) The sender (A), prepares message M and applies hash
function h() to produce commitment cM . cM is sent
to the receiver (B). M contains a counter i to avoid
opportunistic replay attacks.
2) Node B caches cM and generates nonce n. n is sent to
Node A and timer t is started.
3) Node A sends M |n to Node B. Node B recovers nonce
n′ and M . M is accepted only if n′ == n, cM ==
h(M), t is within range and i is unique.
Nodes ignore unsolicited messages received during phase 3
and the cache entries and timer functionality time out after
a permitted period. These measures avoid denial-of-service
attacks on the protocol itself. The timer and cached CM cannot
be reset until they have expired or been used.
Figure 2 shows an example of a small deployment of nodes
using RTTMAP.
C. RTTMAP Security Objectives
The use of Secure RTT prevents an attacker from pretending
to be within the acceptable security range. However, it is
necessary to add additional protection to avoid hijack attacks
on existing sessions.
RTTMAP packets include a counter value i which avoids
opportunistic replay. This is important if the same report may
be sent often as it reduces the chance of an attacker guessing
message content, and thus hash values, in advance.
1To avoid ambiguity, we use the term transfer to refer to the transfer of
data from one node to another. Notice that in RTTMAP this involves three
message transmissions.
Figure 1. RTTMAP involves three message exchanges. (1) A committment.
(2) A nonce. (3) The nonce and a message. The distance d is derived from
the time t minus the response overhead h as shown.
Figure 2. A maximum distance is set for each node (circles) to allows internal
communication only. An attacker cannot inject from the outside (dashed line
to a), but internal communication can occur (solid line to b).
RTTMAP also sends a one-way hash c, rather than the
message M itself in the first phase. This forces the attacker
to participate in all three stages. The one-way property of
h() prevents generation of a valid message within the limited
time frame and without knowledge of M and attacker cannot
generate c in advance.
RTTMAP does not reset the timer or update the cached
committment cM to avoid attacks which may involve an
attacker repeating his initial transmission of h() in hope that
the timer value on the receiver will be continually reset (and
thus resulting in a smaller value).
V. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Node Design
Our evaluation is based on our planned integratation of
a Chirp Spread Spectrum (CSS) transceiver (the NA5TR1
from Nanotron) with a low-power CPU (MSP430). This will
result in an architecture similar to the Tmote Sky[13] sensor
node. The NA5TR1 is different from the existing radio due to
it’s use of CSS rather than older techniques in the CC2420.
Although the NA5TR1 does not properly match RTTMAP in
functionality2, we can use it as a reference for our feasibility
evaluation.
B. Frame Structures
RTTMAP uses three frame structures, one for each phase
of the protocol. See Figure 3. These are identical regardless
of the MAC protocol. All structures include 2 byte source
2The Delivery message would need to be cached and updated within the
transceiver itself, in order to permit fast turnaround on receipt of a Probe
message. We plan to address this later in our future research.
4Figure 3. Frame structures for RTTMAP.
and destination addresses with a 1 byte type field used to
differentiate the frames.
Init messages are used in Phase 1 to initialise a transfer and
require one field. The commit field is 4 bytes land contains the
truncated output cM of the hash function h(). The total length
is thus 9 bytes.
Probe messages are used in Phase 2 to commence measure-
ment of range and require one field. The nonce field is 4 bytes
long. The total length is thus 9 bytes.
Delivery messages are used in Phase 3 to complete ranging
and transfer. There are four fields. The nonce field is 4 bytes
long, containing the nonce delivered by a Probe message. The
1 byte length field contains the length of the payload, which is
a maximum of 255 bytes. The total length is therefore between
11 and 266 bytes.
C. MAC Protocols
RTTMAP involves close interaction between lower layers
in the network stack. This is due to the raw access required
perform ranging measurements using the transceiver. In order
to properly evaluate RTTMAP, it is necessary to specify MAC
protocols to explore the consequences of these choices.
The CSMA protocol checks the channel before transmitting
Init and Probe messages. If the channel is busy, there is a
random backoff before further attempts. Because of the need to
carry out RTT measurement, no channel assessment is carried
out before sending Delivery messages.
The duty-cycling protocol is a derivative of TinyOS Low
Power Listening (LPL). LPL disables the radio, except during
defined periods in an epoch. This saves energy, but requires
that transmissions be extended so that they are delivered
successfully. Channel assessment is carried out in the same
way as the CSMA protocol.
The TDMA protocol uses loose3 time synchronisation.
Nodes transmit only in their own time slot in each epoch.
The slots are long enough to complete a message exchange in
RTTMAP. Channel assessment is not used.
3Although TDMA employs node synchronisation, in reality it is insuffi-
ciently accurate to support ToF range measurement.
D. Node Configuration
All nodes require an address and a maximum range r. These
are computed in advance and stored before deployment. All
nodes also require a hash function, we chose SHA-256 as
efficient implementations (such as MIRACL) are available for
16-bit devices.
During operation, each node will need a timer, operating
at a minimum of approximately 500MHz, to acheive a RTT
accuracy of approximately 33cm. A cache of 8 bytes is
required for the committment and nonce during each exchange.
We expect that these features will eventually be implemented
within the transceiver to eliminate ranging error.
E. Simulation
We simulate RTTMAP in our own Java WSN simulator
called sensorsim. Sensorsim is a state-based program that
simulates a physical space containing sensor nodes and active
transmissions. By simulating network state changes at a scale
of nanoseconds, it is possible to implement working RTTMAP
with high accuracy. We optimise sensorsim by eliminating as
many state updates as possible, it is not feasible to simulate
every nanosecond. Simulated node and transmission objects
are scanned to skip redundant updates thus reducing runtime.
All objects are polled on each iteration, which ensures
updates occur in lock step. During the update it is possible
to change various parameters. For example, the simulator can
change energy parameters to mimick power-cycling protocols
or can calculate the current radius and signal strength of
a transmission (informing relevant sensor node objects of
message arrival). By carefull design we can simulate a net-
work containing an arbitary number of nodes running various
protocols. We can thus gather energy data and count message
transmissions.
We used datasheets[4] of popular WSN hardware, such as
the MSP430 and NA5TR1 transceiver, to derive energy values
for various states. We augmented this with real cryptographic
performance measurements taken from Tmote Sky nodes. The
simulator does not provide real-world propogation characteris-
tics (like reflection), but it can provide useful proof-of-concept
data.
VI. EVALUATION
RTTMAP increases the number of message transmissions
three-fold. Depending on MAC protocol, this causes additional
overhead compared to other schemes and causes interaction
resulting in changes to network reliability. We investigate our
initial findings here.
A. Energy Overhead
There are two elements to energy overhead in a transfer,
the cost of transmission and the cost of cryptography. These
should take into account for both sender and receiver. All
our measurements are in milliamp seconds (mAs), which is
a second of current drain at one milliamp. Our nodes run at
2.3 Volts, the MSP430 draws 1.9mA and the NA5TR1 draws
30mA if sending or 34mA if receiving.
51) Communication Overhead: Since the NA5TR1 draws
less current when transmitting compared to receiving, in
applications where there is no duty-cycling of the radio, there
is no extra energy penalty4 in transmission. Thus RTTMAP
protects against attacks on cryptographic functions with no
large overhead (although channel contention may become an
issue, see below).
In reality, low-power applications will duty-cycle the radio
power to save energy. In low-power state the radio is not able
to receive, so MAC protocols have to ensure that messages
can be successfully exchanged. Two approaches are common,
time synchronisation and extended transmission.
Time synchronisation protocols aim to wake all transceivers
at the same time, so that all transmissions can be heard. The
synchronisation of clocks does not need to be accurate enough
for RF ToF, but is still required to avoid clock drift issues.
Once the synchronisation cost has been accounted for, the cost
of using the radio has an upper bound for the duration of
deployment (roughly equivalent to the duty-cycle multiplied
by receive cost).
Extended transmissions are used by protocols to avoid
synchronisation. These extend transmission so that nodes will
always hear part of the message and stay awake to hear the
end of the message. The cost of transmitting a message is
therefore the cost of keeping the radio active for a full epoch.
In a duty-cycled MAC protocol with an epoch length of e ms,
the cost of sending a message is c∗e/1000 mAs, where c is the
cost in milliamps to transmit a message. This cost should be
doubled since receivers will need to stay awake for longer. In
TinyOS LPL (2% duty-cycle with a 550ms epoch length) this
results in a transfer cost of 33 mAs (2∗16.5) for Init and Probe
messages. The length of the message is unimportant provided
it fits within the epoch. Delivery message cost is based on the
length of the message, since both radios are awake and no
extension is required.
Each message sent using an NA5TR1, at a speed of 1mbps,
is encoded into chirps of 1µs duration per bit. Message
length must include the preamble, sync word and tail element
totalling approx 70µs. Thus Delivery messages take between
81µs to 336µs of time, costing between 0.00243mAs to
0.01008mAs. This cost must also be multipied by two.
2) Cryptographic Overhead: RTTMAP requires two in-
vokations of a hash function, in our case SHA-256. From our
experiments with the MIRACL library on the MSP430 (current
1.9mA) we have calculated that SHA-256 takes 10.17ms to
initialise, followed by an approximate time of 0.32ms for each
byte hashed. Thus the minimum cost of SHA-256 is 10.17ms
and the maximum cost is 91.77ms to protect a full 255byte
payload. The total minimum cost is therefore 0.038646mAs
(based on 20.34ms) and the maximum is 0.348726mAs (based
on 183.54ms).
By contrast, a regular keyed authentication protocol is likely
to require two invokations of a signature function. We evaluate
AES-256 in CBC-MAC mode. On our Tmote Sky nodes, this
completes a single block encryption (of 16 bytes) in 1.11ms,
4We have not considered the cost of message transfer between the CPU
and radio.
each byte thus requires approximately 0.069ms of CPU time.
The minimum cost of AES-256 is thus 0ms and the maximum
is 17.664ms to protect 256 bytes (although the maximum
payload is 255 bytes, AES operates in 16 byte blocks). Thus,
0ms is the minimum cost and 0.1342464mAs the maximum
(based on 2 ∗ 35.328ms).
RTTMAP is thus more expensive in computation for each
exchange in some situations, but we have not considered
public-key algorithms which can be used at the link-layer and
are considerably more expensive (taking several seconds at
best). These can be found in some broadcast authentication
schemes and one of our aims is to protect these.
3) Total Overhead: Performing a transfer between two
nodes using RTTMAP thus costs a minimum of 0.07729mAs
for a 0 byte message in a non-duty cycled MAC to a maximum
of 66.707532mAs for a full size message in the LPL case.
This is based on the three transmissions plus the cost of two
invokations of the hash function SHA256.
We can compare this against a traditional approach using
Message Authentication Codes (MACs). Protocols such as
TinySec[6] require the calculation of a 4 byte MAC (costing
between 0ms and 0.1342464mAs. Although they extend the
packet length, this extra length is absorbed either because
transmission is free or because an extended transmission
is used. Thus existing methods can cost between 33 and
33.1342464mAs.
As we see, RTTMAP costs just over 50% extra in this case,
but for this extra cost it is not necessary to use keys. We argue
that this investment is worthwhile.
B. Energy Performance Under Attack
Before considering RTTMAP as a countermeasure against
denial-of-service attack, it is important to explore the cost of
RTTMAP when it is attacked itself. We show that the worst
case direct energy attack possible by an adversary wastes the
equivallent of one full epoch message transmission plus one
full epoch message reception (total: 33mAs).
Adversaries that inject an Init message will cause the return
of a Probe message. The caching of the commitment and timer
operation will cease after a defined period. The other problem
is the possibility of blocking network access by injecting
continual Init messages and flooding the cache, we argue that
the attacker would need to jam to frequency to carry out this
attack since the timeout is so short.
Injection of Probe messages will cause the return of a
Delivery message if one is waiting. Although the node will
ignore clear channel assessment when replying, we argue that
the attacker is probably able to disrupt the network anyway
by communicating with that node. Since the Init and Probe
messages have no network payload, they cannot be used to
flood the network - which is a more serious concern.
Injection of a Delivery message will result in a number
of operations to authenticate the payload. This part of the
protocol has been deliberately designed for these attacks. The
severity of such injections depends on how far the process
reaches. The first two tests determine if the Delivery is
expected and if the nonces match. These comprise of simple
instructions and are thus inexpensive.
6The node might then carry out a hash operation on the
malicious message, but this is much cheaper than a message
transmission.
Only if the message passes all these operations will the
message then be transmitted to the next hop (and onto its
destination). Considerable effort and luck is required by the
attacker to acheive this. Unlike compromise of a key, the
attacker will need to to repeat the attack in full to repeat the
attack. Keyed protocols would now be defenseless. This is a
strength of RTTMAP.
C. Interation with MAC Protocols and Network Reliability
RTTMAP closely interacts with the MAC protocol as trans-
mission of Delivery messages cannot be delayed by MAC
functions and each transfer involves three transmissions. The
implications depend on the type of MAC protocol employed.
In a TDMA style protocol, the main concern is slot length.
The slot length must be chosen such that it can accommodate
the propogation delay of the three transmissions. Thus the slot
length is primarily related to the distance between nodes and
the modulation duration. The maximum frame sizes are 9,
9 and 266 bytes. These translate into modulation durations
of 142µs, 142µs and 2198µs when the 70µs overhead of
preambles is considered. The total delay purely in modulation
is thus 2482µs. Assuming a maximum range of 300 metres, we
need to add approximately 3µs for radio propogation time (as
there are 3 exchanges). Thus the shortest TDMA slot length
is approximately 2.5ms. This would allow approximately 40
slots per epoch of 100ms, which we feel is quite acceptable.
In a CSMA style protocol, channel contention and reliability
are directly affected by RTTMAP. Message transmissions
effectively take longer, and they affect a wider area. The lack
of channel assessment upon transmission of Delivery messages
means that there is a greater possibility of collision. Since
Delivery messages are the largest, this poses big problems for
using CSMA. Channel assessment could be used, but then the
message would then be dropped by the receiver as being too
late.
To validate this theory, we simulated networks of CSMA-
based sensor nodes randomly placed in a 100x100x100 metre
area. Each sent a status report to the sink (also randomly
placed) at random intervals (of between 100ms and 1 second).
In order to avoid unrealistic synchronisation at startup, all
nodes started transmitting at random offsets. The simulation
ran for 1 simulated second in each case. The experiment
was repeated 20 times for each network size, at the end of
the simulation the number of transmissions sent and those
that successfully arrived were recorded and converted into
reliability. The results are shown in Figure 4.
We can observe from these findings that reliability gradually
degrades as the network becomes denser when using CSMA,
thus we find that RTTMAP works best in a TDMA style proto-
col, because TDMA does not require channel assessment and
therefore collision is less likely. Obviously such an approach
would require a sufficient number of time slots to maintain
high network availability, as we have already shown it is
possible for 40 nodes to share an epoch of 100ms, affording
each node 10 transmission opportunities each second.
Figure 4. CSMA reliability of randomly placed nodes and random transmis-
sion intervals in a 100x100x100 metre area.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has introduced RTTMAP, a message authentica-
tion protocol based on secure round-trip-time measurements.
We have shown that RTTMAP eliminates the need for keys
in some scenarios by restricting access to nodes within a
defined security boundary. We find that RTTMAP costs no
extra in energy overhead where no duty-cycling is in place,
or about 2 times the overhead where duty-cycling is in place.
On simulation of RTTMAP with MAC protocols, we find that
CSMA is a poor choice due to the difficulties in handling
channel assessment. Thus we find that TDMA is the best
choice of MAC for use with RTTMAP.
RTTMAP has not been implemented on real hardware in
this paper, and this is the next phase of our research. We will
be investigating the impact of real world interference, realistic
propogation and further security enhancements in the protocol.
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